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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Of the several decisions handed down during the review
period in the field of Administrative Law, on both the federal
and state levels, few are indicative of substantial change in
the previous trends and attitudes of the courts to the admin-
istrative process. The importance of the cases collected and
reported herein must be found in the refinement of the court's
attitude to its limited role in judicial review, the respect
shown by the courts for the reviewing capacities of the boards
within the various commissions themselves, and, generally, in
the realization that administrative agencies play an ever in-
creasing role in regulating our day-to-day affairs.
I. JuDIcmAL REVIEW
Statutes creating various state and federal administrative
agencies usually provide a definite procedure for appealing
from the administrative mandates or rulings. United States
v. Southern Railway1 emphasizes the importance of strict ad-
herence to the statutory formulation.
Due to a shortage of railroad cars the Interstate Commerce
Commission declared that an "emergency situation" existed.
Car Service Order 947 was promulgated to alleviate the prob-
lem of strict requirements regarding the placement of loaded
cars at the disposal of the consignee and the subsequent
removal of cars once unloaded. The Commission indicated
that notice and public hearing were impracticable and con-
trary to the public interest and that good cause existed for
making the order effective on less than the usual thirty day
notice.2 The Commission is authorized, when an emergency
presents itself and immediate action is required, to dispense
with the notice requirement.3 A copy of the order, which was
to become effective four days later, was served on the Asso-
ciation of American Railroads, agent for most of the nation's
railroads, including Southern. Being thus notified, Southern
could have filed a petition for "rehearing, reargument or re-
1. 380 F.2d 49 (4th Cir. 1967).
2. See 5 U.S.C. § 1003 (c) (1964).
3. See 49 U.S.C. § 1(15) (1964). Usually such orders are issued only
after a hearing at which interested carriers might voice their views, but
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consideration" in advance of the effective date, and the im-
plementation of the Commission's order would have been
automatically stayed ;4 but this was not done.
Southern was charged with twenty violations in its Green-
ville, South Carolina yard, and the maximum fine, $500 per
count, was asked by the Commission. Southern contested this,
taking the position that the order should not be interpreted
to mean liability without fault, asserting that all of the
charged violations, except one, were occasioned by two derail-
ments. Southern declared that its major efforts from January
28, 1964 to March 1, 1964 were concentrated on repairing
damaged tracks to insure an uninterrupted flow of traffic.
They further contended that no "emergency situation" existed
to justify disregard for the hearing requirements" because
the condition had been apparent to the Commission since
1955.
After hearing conflicting testimony as to whether Southern
acted in the most expeditious manner and as to whether com-
pliance was either impossible or unreasonable, the district
court ruled that the Commission's order was open to attack
and granted Southern's motion for summary judgment.6 The
order was held to be a "sweeping pronouncement," the court
reasoning that it "sought to deal with a chronic problem, not
an emergency."' 7
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the verdict in favor of
Southern was reversed on the procedural ground that the
district judge erred in entertaining Southern's motion at all
when the statute expressly provided a method for appeal."
This decision is in accord with a Fifth Circuit decision, in
which the issues were strikingly similar,9 and with several
Supreme Court decisions. Those decisions establish the prin-
ciple that when Congress or state legislatures provide for
administrative or judicial review, designed to permit agency
4. 49 U.S.C. § 17(8) (1964).
5. 49 U.S.C. § 1(15) (1964); see United States v. Southern Ry., 364
F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1966).
6. United States v. Southern Ry., 250 F. Supp. 759 (D.S.C. 1966).
7. Id. at 764.
8. 28 U.S.C. § 2325 (1964) provides: "An interlocutory or permanent
injunction restraining the enforcement, operation or execution, in whole or
in part of any order of the Interstate Commerce Commission shall not be
granted unless the application therefor is heard and determined by a
district court of three Judges .... " (emphasis added).
9. United States v. Southern Ry., 364 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1966).
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expertise to be brought to bear upon particular problems, the
prescribed procedures become exclusive avenues of appeal.10
The important role of the review procedure within an ad-
ministrative agency is pointed out in NLRB v. Winn-Dixie
Greenville, Inc." Employees of Winn-Dixie had been ques-
tioned about their activities of "signing-up" drivers for the
union. One of those questioned, Smith, did eventually sign
twenty drivers and engaged in union activities for six weeks
before he was discharged for violating various rules of the
company and for having a generally unsatisfactory attitude.
The trial examiner ruled that, although the company displayed
unconcealed opposition to unionization, 12 their discharge of
Smith had been spontaneous. Smith appealed the decision and
in its review the Board accepted the subsidiary factual find-
ings of the trial examiner but rejected his ruling. The Board
concluded that the most reasonable inference to be drawn
from the whole record was that Smith had been unlawfully
discharged for union activities.
The defendant objected to the rejection of the trial exam-
iner's ruling, but the court, following NLRB v. Thomason
Plywood Corp.,'3 reiterated its contention that the Board's
decision, even though contrary to the examiner's, will be
upheld if supported by substantial evidence on the whole
record. The Supreme Court has said of the relationship be-
tween the labor board and its trial examiners: "The re-
sponsibility for decision thus placed on the Board is wholly
inconsistent with the notion that it has power to reverse the
examiner's findings only when they are 'clearly erroneous.' "14
It is noteworthy in Winn-Dixie Greenville, Inc. that in its
own review the NLRB was not bound by rule 52 (a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as any federal district
court would have been. (A federal district court would be
bound, in all actions tried without juries, to find the facts
specially.) The non-applicability of this rule shows that the
10. See, e.g., Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co.,
379 U.S. 411 (1965); Callanan Rd. Improvement Co. v. United States, 345
U.S. 507 (1953); United States v. Ruzicka, 329 U.S. 287 (1946); Texas &
Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907).
11. 379 F.2d 958 (4th Cir. 1967).
12. The attitude of Winn-Dixie toward unionization is reflected by the
question asked of Smith by a company vice-president: "What the hell is
this I hear about you signing up drivers?" Id. at 959.
13. 222 F.2d 364 (4th Cir. 1955).
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powers of review within an administrative agency over a de-
cision of a trial examiner are greater than those of an
appellate court reviewing a decision of a trial judge.15
II. ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS: RIGHTS OF ONE ACCUSED
In City of Spartanburg v. Parris,6 the right to be con-
fronted with one's accuser and to cross-examine him in an
action before the Civil Service Commission was explored. The
opinion is valuable for its conciseness and the clarity with
which its principle is stated.
Parris, a police officer of the City of Spartanburg, was
discharged for several reasons, including accepting a gift
from a suspect being investigated by him. Much of the evi-
dence presented against Parris in the Civil Service Commis-
sion proceeding was contained in the affidavit of one Calvin
Honeycutt whom the court described as "an unsavory charac-
ter with a long criminal record." On appeal, the circuit court
held that the admission of the affidavit and the consequent
denial of Parris' right to be confronted with his accuser was
reversible error. The circuit court ordered the case remanded
to the Commission with instructions to rehear the case within
thirty days, to examine Honeycutt in person, or to reinstate
Parnis with pay.
On appeal, the supreme court ruled that though strict
rules of evidence are not applicable to the hearings of admin-
istrative agencies, the substantive rights of the parties must
be preserved. While the supreme court did agree that funda-
mental fairness required exclusion of the Honeycutt affidavit,
it modified the circuit court ruling that Parris be reinstated
with pay unless there was a hearing at which Honeycutt
appeared within thirty days. A new hearing was ordered, but
the city was given the option of having Honeycutt appear or
of trying Parris without relying on the affidavit at all.
Parris indicates that persons tried before administrative
agencies do have certain rights of confrontation and cross-
examination. In this case the rights were protected, however,
by rules of evidence and the constitutional due process issue
was thus avoided. It is doubtful that the Parris decision will
15. See also NLRB v. A.P.W. Products Co., 316 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1963).
16. 161 S.E.2d 228 (S.C. 1968).
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have affect on the loyalty-security type of administrative
investigation or review. In those cases, 17 persons who have
years of experience and clean records in government employ
have been summarily dismissed because of charges made
by "unidentified informants." The opinions of our courts
in this loyalty-security area deny the existence of any con-
stitutional rights of the accused; the right to fair trial seem-
ingly existent only where national security is not at issue.
Parris may be differentiated in at least two ways from the
security type investigation decisions: (1) national security
was not involved; and (2) the identity of the accuser was
not withheld. Only to this extent can Parris be cited as a
sound precedent for defining the rights of an accused in an
administrative proceeding.
III. ADMINISTRATIVE RULINGS
Another interesting controversy, to which an administrative
board was a party, might be cited for a rule, sounding in
contract, but applying to administrative procedure: When
an administrative ruling is sought of and given by a proper
administrative board, and the persons seeking the ruling
thereafter act in good faith reliance to their financial detri-
ment, the board, under ordinary circumstances, is without
the power to reverse its original ruling. In Nuck/es v. Allenl s
the South Carolina Supreme Court found a certain "property
right" vested in the concerned party who relied on the ruling,
stating that a finding of public necessity would be required
before the board would have the power to reverse itself. The
position taken by the court is in accord with the general at-
titude toward this type of problem.19
Once again the Industrial Commission was challenged sev-
eral times for decisions in their workmen's compensation pro-
ceedings. McDonald v. Kenneth Cotton Mills20 clarified the
role of judicial review of an Industrial Commission ruling.
The circuit court misinterpreted Dennis v. William's Furni-
ture Corp.21 to mean that the Commission's findings of fact
17. See, e.g., Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
18. 250 S.C. 123, 156 S.E.2d 633 (1967).
19. 2 AM. Jun. 2d Administrative Law § 525 (1962).
20. 250 S.C. 51, 156 S.E.2d 324 (1967).
21. 243 S.C. 53, 132 S.E.2d 1 (1963). In this decision the Commission
ruled "as a fact" that the claim in question had been filed within one year.
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were only conclusions of law and therefore reviewable. There-
upon, they misapplied Glenn v. Dunean Mills22 and endeavored
to review the evidence "in the light most favorable" to the
claimant. Laboring under these misconceptions, the circuit
court reviewed all of the evidence in a light most favorable to
the claimant and awarded McDonald compensation. The su-
preme court reversed, indicating that by statutory mandate
the decision of the Commission is conclusive on all issues of
fact 23 and that the circuit court was limited in its review to
pointing out errors of law.
In other decisions the reviewing powers within the In-
dustrial Commission were scrutinized. Shealy v. Algernon
Blair, Inc. 24 indicates that the Commission has a duty to make
a specific finding upon which compensation might rest. The
Commission must be satisfied that at least two factors, wage
loss and causation of wage loss by work-connected injury,
are present before compensation is awarded.25 South Caro-
lina statutes define disability;26 the Industrial Commission
must find such incapacity to earn wages and then must award
compensation only after balancing certain other factors within
the statutory scheme.27 The administrative agency must
fulfill its statutory obligations or its decisions are subject to
judicial review and reversal.
In Green v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. 28 the capacity of the
full Commission to make its own findings of fact and to reach
its own conclusions of law (whether or not consistent with
those of the hearing commissioner, and regardless of whether
his holdings were based on competent evidence or based on
because there had been no competent evidence of any causal connection be-
tween the original injury and the claimant's disability; hence, there was
nothing to sustain a finding that a claim was timely filed. The Commis-
sion's finding here is reviewable as a conclusion of law or as a finding of
fact without competent evidentiary support.
22. 242 S.C. 535, 131 S.E.2d 696 (1963). When a lower court has
awarded benefits, the reviewing court must look at the evidence in a light
favorable to the claimants to see if there was, in fact, competent evidential
support for the award.
23. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-356 (1962).
24. 250 S.C. 106, 156 S.E.2d 646 (1967).
25. 2 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS § 57.61 (1961).
26. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-10 (1962).
27. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-152 (1962). The statute provides a formula for
compensation which is a supplement to the average amounts the employee
is able to earn subsequent to a job connected accident, based on a percent-
age of the difference between the average salary before and after the in-
jury.
28. 250 S.C. 58, 156 S.E.2d 318 (1967).
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credibility of the witness) was recognized. The court ruled,
however, that in its review of the facts, the Commission must
take into account all of the evidence, and that the taking of
and relying on unsworn testimony of part of the witnesses
constituted reversible error.
Green was discharged from Raybestos in June 1965 and,
shortly thereafter, filed claim under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Law for a 1963 back injury. The hearing commis-
sioner ruled that Green had failed to give proper notice to
both his employer and the Workmen's Compensation Com-
mission.2 9 After examining the claimant informally, the
Commission disagreed with and overruled the hearing com-
missioner. The full Commission has broad powers of re-
view,30 but because in this type of situation the credibility of
witnesses is of key importance to the determination of the
case, it is important that the Commission take all of the testi-
money from all of the witnesses and pass on the credibility of
each. This requirement does not curb the power of the full
Commission to make its own findings of fact and to reach its
own conclusions of law, consistent or inconsistent with the
hearing commissioner, but the added requirement does assure
that on reaching its decision the full commission has the op-
portunity to review all of the evidence.
J. HAMILTON STEWART, III
29. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 72-301, -803 (1962). Proper notification to an
employer must be within thirty days; the Workmen's Compensation Com-
mission must be notified within one year.
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